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This paper examines the role of regulation and competition in generic markets. Generics offer large
potential savings to payers and consumers of pharmaceuticals. Whether the potential savings are realized
depends on the extent of generic entry and uptake and the level of generic prices. In the U.S., the regulatory,
legal and incentive structures encourage prompt entry, aggressive price competition and patient switching
to generics. Key features are that pharmacists are authorized and incentivized to switch patients to
cheap generics. By contrast, in many other high and middle income countries, generics traditionally
competed on brand rather than price because physicians rather than pharmacies are the decision-makers.
Physician-driven generic markets tend to have higher generic prices and may have lower generic uptake,
depending on regulations and incentives. 
Using IMS data to analyze generic markets in the U.S., Canada, France, Germany, U.K., Italy, Spain,
Japan, Australia, Mexico, Chile, Brazil over the period 1998-2009, we estimate a three-equation model
for number of generic entrants, generic prices and generic volume shares. We find little effect of originator
defense strategies, significant differences between unbranded and unbranded generics, variation across
countries in volume response to prices. Policy changes adopted to stimulate generic uptake and reduce
generic prices have been successful in some E.U. countries.
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I.  Introduction 
 
Pharmaceutical markets in the U.S. are characterized by relatively high prices while 
drugs are on patent, followed by rapid generic entry and low generic prices once patents expire. 
In 2009, generics accounted for 74.5 percent of prescriptions (Berndt and Aitken, 2010) but only 
about 20 percent of sales, because generic erosion is rapid and generic prices are low, relative to 
originator prices in the U.S. By contrast, generic penetration is slower and generic prices are 
higher, both absolutely and relative to originator prices, in many other countries, implying only 
modest savings from generics for payers and patients. These modest generic savings are prima 
facie surprising. Post-patent entry should in theory be profitable for generic producers and 
appealing for customers, because generics can largely free-ride on the R&D and informational 
investments made by originator firms, thereby realizing much lower cost structures. Expiry of 
patent barriers to entry also makes generic markets potentially more competitive than originator 
markets. 
This paper argues that these cross-national differences in generic shares and prices reflect 
differences in regulatory and reimbursement policies that drive countries to have either 
pharmacy-driven or physician-driven generic markets. The U.S. is a prototypical pharmacy-
driven generic market. Pharmacists are the key decision-maker for generics, because they are 
legally authorized to substitute any substitutable (AB-rated) generic unless the physician 
explicitly requires the brand, which is rare. U.S. pharmacies have financial incentives to prefer 
cheaper generics and brand is irrelevant for substitutable generics that by regulation are certified 
to be bioequivalent to the originator. Generics are therefore unbranded and compete on price for 
the business of highly-price conscious pharmacies. Centralized purchasing by large chain 
pharmacies has intensified generic competition in the U.S. Tiered co-payment structures have 
encouraged patients to accept generics. However, pharmacies decide which generic to dispense 
and patients, payers/PBMs and physicians usually play no role in choosing one generic 
manufacturer over another (except for drugs dispensed through the mail, for which the PBMs 
operate their own pharmacies). The U.K. and Canada resemble the U.S. pharmacy-driven generic 
model in some respects, but with important differences, notably in Canada which regulates 
generic prices rather than relying on competition.   
By contrast, the regulation/reimbursement structure for generics in many other countries 
has traditionally given less authority and fewer or even perverse incentives to pharmacies. In 4 
 
particular, substitution was only permitted if the physician prescribed by chemical name (which 
is uncommon except in the U.K.), and pharmacy dispensing fees that increased with the price of 
the drug discouraged substitution of cheaper products, even if permitted. In markets where 
pharmacists are either not authorized or incentivized to substitute, physicians prescribe generics 
and originators by brand name and have little incentive to be price-sensitive (unless they are 
personally at risk for drug costs). Generic companies therefore market “branded generics” that 
compete on brand rather than price. Among major E.U. markets, France, Spain, Italy and 
Germany were traditionally physician-driven, branded generic markets. Latin America also has 
physician-driven, branded generic markets, with the added feature that many of these branded 
generics are “similar” (have not met bioequivalence standards to the originator) and are therefore 
of uncertain quality. Our basic hypothesis is that branded generics in physician-driven generic 
markets will tend to be higher priced and have lower market shares than unbranded generics in 
pharmacy-driven generic markets. 
During the 2000’s, all the major E.U. countries adopted policy changes to reduce prices 
and/or increase generic uptake and thereby realize generic savings. In 1989, Germany adopted 
generic reference pricing to encourage competition in off-patent products and expanded the 
system to include on-patent products in 2005. France, Italy and Spain adopted variants of generic 
reference pricing in the early 2000’s.
1 Although such RP systems usually induce originators to 
cut prices to the RP, whether they create strong incentives for generic competition below the 
initial RP depends critically on rules and incentives for pharmacy substitution. Most of these 
countries have also expanded authorization for pharmacy substitution and modified dispensing 
fees to incentivize generic use. Since 2007, German sickness funds have contracted directly with 
generic companies, using competitive bidding to drive price competition and capture the 
resulting savings for payers.  
Latin American markets were also traditionally physician-driven, branded generic 
markets, but with many “similares” or copy products that were launched prior to originator 
patent expiry and were not required to meet bioequivalence standards. Brazil and Mexico have 
established regulatory frameworks to authorize true, bioequivalent generics, but many similares 
remain on the market. Pharmacy substitution is usually not legally authorized in countries where 
                                                            
1 Under generic reference pricing, the payer sets a single reference price (RP) as a maximum reimbursement for all 
generically equivalent products, leaving the patient to pay any excess of the manufacturer’s price over the RP. 5 
 
generics are not required to be bioequivalent. In practice, patients often purchase drugs without a 
prescription, in which case pharmacists may advise on substitution. Because generic quality is 
uncertain, brand plays an important role in generic choice. Thus although patients generally pay 
out-of-pocket for outpatient drugs and are presumably price sensitive, quality uncertainty leads 
to competition on brand and undermines competition on price.  
In Japan, physicians and hospitals traditionally dispensed the drugs that they prescribed 
and captured any margin between a drug’s reimbursement price and its market price (or 
acquisition cost). Branded generics were the norm. Their incentive was to maintain the 
reimbursement price as high as possible, to enable discounting of the market price below the 
reimbursement price, to increase the margin realized by the dispensing providers. Savings 
accrued to payers only with a lag, as reimbursement prices were adjusted based on market prices 
every two years. Unbranded generics had little presence in Japan until recent reforms.  
This paper examines the performance of generic markets in 10 countries (the U.S., the 
U.K., Germany, France and Spain, Italy, Japan, Canada, Brazil and Mexico) over the period 
1998-2009. Our analysis draws on data from IMS Health Inc. on the universe of drug sales in 
these countries. Our data permit both between-country comparison of branded vs. unbranded 
generic markets and within-country comparison over time, to estimate effects of the policy 
changes. We estimate a model for three dimensions of generic markets: any entry and number of 
generic manufacturers; generic prices, relative to baseline originator prices; and generic volume 
share. We examine how each of these dimensions of generic markets changed over time in 
response to policy changes.  
We also examine the effects on generic markets of originator defense strategies, 
specifically, launch of new licensed brand products (co-branding) or new formulations prior to 
patent expiry. Theory and prior evidence suggest that co-branding may be effective in physician-
driven, branded generic markets (for Italy, see Pammoli et al. 2002; for Germany, see Appelt, 
2009); however, such strategies are less likely to be effective in pharmacy-driven, unbranded 
generics market. Launching new formulations prior to patent expiry on older formulations may 
be a rational strategy in both market types, depending on reimbursement rules. Originator 
strategies to deter generic entry have been the focus of the E.U. Generics Inquiry. 
Our empirical evidence confirms that generic price competition is greater in pharmacy-
driven markets than in physician-driven markets, provided that pharmacies face financial 6 
 
incentives to prefer cheaper products. Branded generics, which predominate in physician-driven 
markets, are less price competitive than unbranded generics that predominate in pharmacy-driven 
markets, as predicted. Our results confirm previous evidence that generic entry is related to 
market size; however, differences across countries in number of generic competitors is not 
explained by overall market size, plausibly because the extent of price competition, cost 
structures and profit margins also differ. We find little evidence that originator defense strategies 
are successful on average, except that launch of delayed release formulations does deter generic 
penetration in the U.S. Recent changes in generic regimes in four previously physician-driven, 
branded generic markets of the E.U. (Spain, France, Italy and Germany) have had significant 
effects, with unbranded generics gaining share. However, these countries still lag the U.S. and 
U.K. in speed and extent of generic penetration.  
 
II. Generic Regulation and Reimbursement 
 
Generic entry is constrained in all countries that are members of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) by patents and regulatory protections of innovator products. Although all 
WTO countries must recognize a 20-year product patent term, effective patent life for 
pharmaceuticals is typically shorter but differs across countries (Grabowski and Kyle, 2007). 
Most countries provide for some patent term restoration to compensate for time lost during 
R&D, and a data exclusivity period during which generics may not reference the originator data 
for regulatory approval. Patents may also be challenged prior to expiry, and this is increasingly 
common in the U.S. The originator’s effective patent life post launch is the net result of all these 
factors. 
Patents may be challenged in any country, but the U.S. is unique in rewarding successful 
challenges, by granting 180-day market exclusivity to the first generic to successfully challenge 
the originator patents (a paragraph IV certification).
2 During this 180 days, the originator may 
market an authorized generic (licensed under the originator’s NDA), but no other ANDA-
approved generics can enter. These paragraph IV and associated 180-day exclusivities have 
reportedly become increasingly common since the late 1990’s, which is expected to result in 
                                                            
2 The 1984 Waxman-Hatch Act’s Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) process permits generic approval 
with evidence of bioequivalence, once the originator’s patents and other exclusivities have expired or been 
successfully challenged. 7 
 
higher generic prices during the first two quarters post launch in the U.S. Greater use of 
paragraph IV may also result in earlier generic entry over time in the U.S., unless it is offset by 
increased originator use of mechanisms for patent and exclusivity extensions. 
  In addition to patent and data exclusivity provisions, the incentives for generic entry and 
generic price competition depend on regulatory rules affecting generic competition and 
reimbursement, including rules government pharmacists’ authority to substitute generics; 
reimbursement incentives for substitution; whether generic prices are regulated or competitively 
set; and patients’ incentives to accept generics, through co-payment structures. The tiered co-
payment structure in the US offers patients a larger financial incentive to accept generics than in 
any other country.  
Table 1 summarizes regulatory and reimbursement characteristics of our sample 
countries. This is an oversimplification of the complex regimes and changes over time in each 
country.
3 As a rough characterization, we assume that the U.S., the U.K., and Canada are 
primarily pharmacy-driven generics markets, and physician-driven markets include France, 
Germany, Italy, and Spain at the start of our period, plus Japan, Brazil, and Mexico.  
Most countries implemented changes in the 2000’s. France, Germany, Italy, and Spain 
implemented multiple policy changes to stimulate generic uptake and/or reduce prices. The U.K. 
changed its rules for setting generic reimbursement in 2005. Brazil and Mexico encouraged 
bioequivalence testing and the growth of unbranded generics. The U.S. experienced some growth 
in paragraph IV challenges, and the 2003 Medicare Modernization Act reduced the incentives for 
originators to list late patents by permitting only one 30-month stay per molecule.
4 Some 
Canadian provinces reduced the regulated prices on generics, and other changes were adopted in 
2010, after our observation period. Our empirical analysis tests for effects of these changes in 
each country. 
 
III.  Previous Literature 
 
Early studies of generic entry and price competition focused on the U.S. Models of 
number of entrants have consistently found that generic entry is related to market size (for 
example, Scott Morton, 1999; Saha et al., 2006) and that generic prices are inversely related to 
                                                            
3 More detail is reported in an Appendix available upon request from the corresponding author. 
4 When a generic company challenges an originator patent, the originator may obtain an injunction for up to 30 
months or the resolution of the litigation, whichever occurs first.  8 
 
number of generic competitors in the U.S. (Grabowski and Vernon, 1992; Saha et al., 2006). 
Most previous studies do not address the role of pharmacies as key decision-makers in U.S. 
generic markets and the effects of pharmacy-driven markets on the nature of competition. 
Several papers (for example, Scott Morton, 2000) hypothesize that originator firms may use 
promotion to deter generic penetration but find no effects. This is unsurprising in the context 
where pharmacy substitution is the norm, such that detailing to persuade physicians to choose a 
particular brand does not assure that the originator product is dispensed. In such markets, 
originator advertising generally declines and ultimately ceases as patent expiration approaches.
5 
Reiffen and Ward (2005) estimate a structural model of generic entry and prices using data from 
the early 1990s. 
  Several recent papers have examined generic uptake in other countries. Hollis (2003) 
reports on anti-competitive effects of strategic licensing of brand-controlled “pseudo-generics” in 
Canada, which are found to deter generic entry. Magazzini et al. (2004) examine generic entry in 
the U.S., the U.K., Germany and France using sales data from July 1987-December 1998 on 
major molecules with patent expiry 1986-1996. Using a Tobit estimator applied to pooled panel 
data for the four countries, they conclude that market share of licensed products (defined as 
products launched within 3 years of patent expiry) is negatively related to unbranded generic 
market share whereas number of different brand names has a positive effect. Possible reasons for 
these apparently contradictory findings are not explored.
6  Appelt (2009) provides evidence of 
originator licensing strategies prior to patent expiry and branded generics’ use of trade marks to 
enhance brand competition in Germany’s branded generic market. Hudson (2000) examines 
generic entry and erosion of brand shares in four markets (U.S., U.K., Germany and Japan) using 
data from the early 1990’s which predates the more recent growth in generic erosion in the U.S. 
and pro-generic policy changes in other countries. Moreno-Torres et al. (2009) provide detailed 
evidence on generic entry in Spain. Ghislandi et al. (2005) and Garattini and Ghislandi (2006) 
discuss recent changes in Italy. Kanavos et al. (2008) and Puig-Junoy (2010) discuss European 
price regulation and its impact on generic competition. 
                                                            
5 Ellison and Ellison (2011) find weak evidence for pre-patent expiry use of promotion to deter generic entry by 
medium-sized incumbents, using data from 1986-1992, which predate the growth of payer strategies to encourage 
pharmacy substitution and generic uptake by patients.   
6 They regress market share of unbranded drugs on lagged market share of licensed products in an uncensored Tobit 
model that includes markets with no generics. The negative coefficient on licensed products may be dominated by 
the observations with zero generic share (for which the relationship is necessarily negative), and it is unclear 
whether it would hold in the subset of market with generic entry.  9 
 
Our paper adds to these previous studies by providing a consistent analysis and 
comparison across 10 different countries and over a more recent time period that includes 
experience after the recent reforms in several countries. Our approach is also the first to focus on 
the importance of pharmacy substitution and pharmacy incentives in creating pharmacy-driven 
rather than physician-driven generic markets, and the resulting distinction between competition 
focused on price vs. brand. 
  
IV.  Data  
 
The data for this study are from the IMS MIDAS database of quarterly sales of all drugs 
over the period 1998-2009 in 10 countries, including the major E.U. markets, two major Latin 
American markets, the U.S., Canada and Japan. Within this universe of products, we define the 
sample of molecules potentially subject to generic entry as molecules with global age (years 
since first global launch of the molecule) between 8 and 20 years. This age window was selected 
based on the assumption that product patents are filed at roughly the same date in all countries, 
that R&D (discovery, preclinical and clinical trials, and regulatory review) typically absorbs at 
least 8 of the 20 year patent term, and that most countries offer patent extensions or 
supplementary protection certificates for up to 5 years to compensate for this loss.
7 This age 
range encompasses the ages with greatest generic entry, although entry in most countries spans a 
longer age range. We define the lag in generic entry of product i in country j as months from first 
originator launch of that product in country j, recognizing that this lag may reflect legal barriers 
as well as economic factors.
8  
Our analysis focuses on single molecule prescription drugs in the retail pharmacy 
channel. We exclude combination products, for which global age and hence generic eligibility 
are ambiguous. We exclude biologics because they are ineligible for the standard abbreviated 
generic approval procedures in the U.S. and most other countries.
9 We also excluded 
miscellaneous therapeutic categories (hospital solutions, diagnostic agents, various) and unusual 
forms (non-human use, use unknown). IMS assigns each product into one of five license 
                                                            
7 Defining products eligible for generic entry by expiry date of all listed patents is not appropriate, even if we had 
the data, because generic companies increasingly challenge listed patents prior to their expiry.  
8 Major differences across countries in regulatory and reimbursement barriers to generic entry are described in an 
Appendix, which is available upon request from the corresponding author. 
9 Abbreviated approval procedures for biosimilars have been outlined in the E.U. and U.S. in the late 2000’s. 
Although a few biosimilars have been launched, their higher regulatory costs and lower substitutability make them 
very different from chemical generics analyzed here.  10 
 
categories: originator brand, licensee, branded generic, unbranded generic, or “Patent not 
assigned”.
10 Our analysis is at the level of the presentation (molecule-form-strength) because 
pharmacy substitution is authorized only within presentation. All price and sales data are 
adjusted to 2009 values using country-specific general producer price indexes (PPIs) as the best 
available measure of input costs. Most analysis is in local currency units, but where prices are 
converted to U.S. dollars we use 2009 exchange rates.  
Although this IMS database is more comprehensive and more detailed than the data used 
in previous studies, certain limitations must be noted. First, the IMS categorization of generics as 
branded or unbranded is the best available but may nevertheless be an imperfect indicator for 
whether products compete primarily on brand or price. Second, the products designated as 
generics in some countries, notably Brazil and Mexico, include copy products (similares), some 
of which entered early in the originator life, due to lack -- or weak enforcement -- of product 
patent regimes, and are not necessarily bioequivalent to the originator drug.
11 Third, the IMS 
data do not designate which generics have met bioequivalence tests and hence are more likely to 
be considered substitutes by physicians, pharmacists and patients than those that lack a 
bioequivalence certification. Fourth, when a merger occurs between two firms, IMS consolidates 
their separate data retroactively. Our data may therefore potentially undercount the number of 
generic competitors, particularly in the earlier years.  
 
V.  Empirical Framework and Methods  
 
Our descriptive and regression analyses focus on the main determinants of overall generic 
savings to payers: whether and when generic entry occurs; number of branded and unbranded 
generic competitors; generic and originator prices; and generic volume shares. The analysis is at 
the level of the presentation-country-quarter, defined by molecule, four-digit anatomical 
therapeutic class, formulation and strength, because pharmacy substitution of generics is 
authorized only between presentations with the same molecule, formulation and strength. We 
                                                            
10 We used the corporation and molecule age to reassign products with Patent Not Assigned into branded generic or 
unbranded generic status. 
11 We excluded from these calculations the small number of generic launches that reportedly occurred within 5 years 
of the originator launch, except in countries where such early launch dates are plausible due to late adoption of 
patent regimes (Brazil, Mexico, Italy, and Spain). For other countries, we reassigned the license status of these 
implausibly early generics from branded generic to licensed brand and included them as licensees in all other 
analysis. We also exclude generics for which no originator is present in any year of our data.  11 
 
estimate a four equation model for: any generic entry for the i
th presentation in country j in year 
t; number of generic firms, conditional on entry; generic or originator price (relative to baseline 
originator price); and generic volume share:  
Gijt = f1 (Rijt-2; Dijt-2; Fij; Mij; Zt; u1ijt)       ( 1 )  
Nijt = f2 (Rijt-2; Dijt-2; Fij; Mij; Zt; u2ijt)       ( 2 )  
Pijt = g (Nijt
b; Nijt
u; Fij; Mij; Zt; u3ijt)                       (3) 
Sijt = h (Pijt; Nijt
b; Nijt
u; Fij; Mij; Zt; u4ijt)                   (4) 
where Gijt is an indicator for Any Generic entrant in the presentation-country-year, Nijt is number 
of generic manufacturers (branded and unbranded), conditional on entry, Pijt is normalized price 
(generic or originator, defined below), Sijt is generic volume share; Rijt-2 is molecule sales in the 
presentation-country lagged 2 quarters; Dijt-2 is a vector of (lagged) originator defense strategies; 
Fij is a vector of indicators for non-oral forms; and Mij is molecule-specific characteristics. Zt is a 
vector of indicators for two time periods, 2002-05 and 2006-09, that test for changes in the 
dependent variable, relative to the referent period, 1998-2001. 
We estimate separate regressions for each country, to permit all coefficients to vary by 
country. Other details of the estimation approach are reported in Section VI.B., with reporting of 
regression results. We now discuss the rationale for included variables and their measurement: 
   
1.  Any Generic (G) and Number of Generics (N)
  
Sales (R): We postulate the same model for entry of Any Generic and Number of Generics, 
conditional on entry, but allow parameter estimates to differ. Following Bresnahan and Reiss 
(1991), Scott Morton (1999, 2000) and others, equations (1) and (2) hypothesize that any generic 
entry and number of generic competitors in a presentation-market depend on the market size (R, 
gross sales), assuming certain fixed entry cost per firm, due to regulatory and other entry 
requirements that may differ across countries. Market size is measured by annual sales at 
manufacturer prices in the retail and hospital channels combined, lagged two quarters.
12 Costs of 
entry differ by formulation (F), with higher manufacturing and regulatory costs for intravenous, 
topical, and other complex forms compared to simple oral solids (tablets and capsules).  
                                                            
12 The appropriate lag for the Originator sales variable depends on when generic firms make entry decisions. If 
potential entrants accurately project market sales at the time they are likely to enter, our two quarter lagged revenue 
measure should reasonably characterize the expected relative market size that was relevant to generic decisions to 
undertake entry.  12 
 
Originator Defense Strategies (D): We test for effects of three potential originator 
defense strategies: Number of Licensees, Number of New Originator Formulations launched just 
prior to patent expiry, and OTC share, all lagged two quarters. Originators may have incentives 
to launch co-branded licensees to steel share and pre-empt generic competitors in physician-
driven generic markets with brand competition. Such incentives are not expected in price-
competitive, pharmacy-driven markets such as the U.S., except for authorized generics launched 
during the Paragraph IV exclusivity period.
13 Incentives to launch improved formulations, such 
as extended release forms, may exist in both pharmacy and physician-driven markets, because 
generic substitution is only permitted within a formulation. The originator’s incentive to launch 
new formulations close to patent expiry of older forms is increased if the new forms receive 
some additional patent or regulatory exclusivity and can be reimbursed at prices above the price 
of generic versions of the older formulations. Such conditions exist in the U.S., where aggressive 
marketing can successfully switch physicians/patients to the new, protected forms and away 
from the patent-expiring form which faces generic entry. However, launching new formulations 
is less likely to be profitable in countries where reference pricing or similar reimbursement rules 
limit reimbursement for all formulations of a molecule to the lowest price per daily dose for that 
molecule, which is likely to be a generic once the patent expires on any formulation in the 
molecule. Finally, for molecules that meet regulatory requirements for patient self-medication, 
originators may launch an over-the-counter (OTC) formulation to preempt generic competition 
in the Rx formulation after patent expiry.  
   Molecule Global Age, Launch Lag and Diffusion (M) and Form (F): Molecule Global 
Age (months since first launch of the molecule in any of our sample countries, hereafter “global 
launch”) is included as a proxy for unobserved patent term. The greater Molecule Global Age, 
the more likely that unobserved patents and other exclusivity barriers to entry have expired. 
Country-specific Molecule Launch Lag (months from global launch to first launch in country j) 
is a proxy for country-specific data exclusivities that usually run from the originator’s country-
specific launch. It is also expected to be positively associated with generic entry. Global 
                                                            
13 In the U.S., several originator firms in the early 1990’s launched their own generic products to compete with true 
generics; however this strategy simply accelerated the downward pressure on generic prices and was abandoned. 
Originator launch of generics in the U.S. is now confined to “authorized generics” launched during the 180-day 
exclusivity period awarded to paragraph IV challengers, when prices remain high because only one ANDA-
approved generic competitor is present..  13 
 
Diffusion, measured as the number of countries in our sample in which the molecule is launched, 
is an indicator for availability of foreign supply sources and possible economies of scale for 
generic suppliers; it is expected to be positively associated with entry. A vector of Formulation 
indicators (F) controls for formulations (extended release, intravenous, topical, other complex 
forms) that have higher manufacturing and/or regulatory costs  than the referent oral solid forms, 
and are therefore expected to attract less generic entry. 
Regulatory Changes (Z): Entry incentives depend on regulatory and reimbursement 
provisions, which differ by country and over time within country. Because regulatory and 
reimbursement policies affecting generics differ significantly across countries and several 
countries changed multiple policies over our time period, we use two indicator variables for 
years 2002-2005 and 2006-2009 to measure the combined effects of country-specific policy 
changes. The referent period is 1998-2001.  
 
2.  Normalized Generic Price  
Our measure of generic price Pijt
G for presentation i in country j in period t is the volume-
weighted average generic price for all generic versions of presentation ijt, normalized (divided) 
by the earliest originator price for presentation i in country j in our dataset. This normalization 
yields a unit-free measure of price that permits comparison of trends over time and across 
molecules and countries, for products with very different absolute price levels. It is independent 
of exchange rates and country-specific changes in the originator price.
14   
Number of Generic Competitors (N): Under standard models of competition, normalized 
generic price is expected to be inversely related to number of generic competitors, with a greater 
effect for unbranded generic competitors (N
u) than for branded generic competitors (N
b). The 
effect of generic competitors on price is expected to be greater in countries with pharmacy-
driven vs. physician-driven markets.
15  
Regulatory Changes (Z), Formulation (F), and Molecule Characteristics (M): Time 
period indicators are included to capture effects of regulatory and reimbursement changes that 
affected generic prices directly, such as the change in reimbursement rules in the U.K., reference 
                                                            
14 Several previous papers use the contemporaneous generic/brand price ratio, which may confound changes in 
generic prices in the denominator with changes in originator prices in the numerator.  
15 N can be treated as predetermined in the price equation due to the regulatory lag in getting market authorization. 
In the U.S., this takes at least a couple of years.  14 
 
pricing in France, or sickness fund contracting in Germany. Formulation indicators and Global 
Diffusion control for cost differences.  
  
3.  Normalized Originator Price    
We estimate a similar model of normalized originator price Pijt
O, also normalized to the 
earliest originator price for the same presentation in the dataset. Frank and Salkever (1992, 1997) 
and Regan (2008) have argued that originators pursue a segmentation strategy that leads to 
increased originator price in response to generic competition. Although this may have been an 
optimal strategy in the 1990’s in the U.S., this may no longer be true in the 2000’s, given the 
growth of insurance plans that require patients to pay the difference between the generic co-pay 
and the originator price or third-tier co-payment.. In most countries other than the US, including 
the U.K., price regulatory systems disallow post-launch originator price increases and, more 
generally, may make segmentation pricing strategies infeasible and/or non-optimal. In countries 
with generic reference pricing, such as Germany and France, although pricing above the 
reference price is permitted in theory, in practice originators usually cut price to the reference 
price because patient demand is very elastic above the reference price (see Stargardt, 2010, for 
recent evidence from Germany). Thus normalized originator prices are expected to be flat or 
declining after generic entry in most countries. It is an empirical question whether increasing 
price in response to generic entry remains an optimal strategy in the US and possibly Mexico, 
where price regulation is weakly enforced.  
 
4.  Generic Volume Share  
Generic volume share is expected to be inversely related to generic price in pharmacy-
driven markets. In physician-driven markets, price sensitivity is expected to be weaker, 
especially for branded generics and before reforms to stimulate price sensitivity. Simultaneous 
determination of price and volume is expected in countries where generic prices are 
competitively determined (U.S., U.K.). We therefore estimate eq. (4) with both OLS and two-
stage least squares (2SLS), in which generic price is treated as endogenous using the hospital 
price and an indicator for chronic medications as instruments. For other countries where generic 
prices are set by regulation or constrained through RP reimbursement, generic prices may be less 
responsive to market conditions, in which case OLS estimation may be appropriate. The Generic 15 
 
Volume Share equations also include as control variables: number of branded and unbranded 
competitors (treated as predetermined), generic age (months since first generic launch of 
presentation i in country j), formulation and molecule effects, as well as time dummies to capture 
regulatory changes.  
 
VI.  Results 
 
A. Descriptive Analysis 
 
We first characterize the cross-national differences in generic markets using graphic 
analysis to compare generic entry, generics prices and shares across countries. For some 
variables, we compare starting (1998-2001) and ending (2006-2009) values, hereafter referred to 
as 2001 and 2009. For other variables, we show average values over the entire period to conserve 
space, but note that this masks the changes over time, which are discussed later. Descriptive 
statistics are reported in Appendix Table 1. 
 
1.  Any Generic and Number of Generics  
Almost all countries experienced an increase in the percent of molecules in the 8-20 year 
cohort with generic entry over the 2000’s decade (Figure 1). France had the largest percentage 
increase from 7 to 25 percent. Brazil has the highest generic presence, with 41 percent of 
molecules age 8-20 years having a generic, plausibly reflecting similares that entered before 
patent protection. 
Figure 2 shows the effective patent life or mean age of the originator at first generic entry 
for the molecule (Generic launch lag).
16 The low initial values in 2001 for Spain (8.1 years) and 
Italy (8.7 years) may reflect originator-initiated (“authorized”) generics that do not represent a 
true generic challenge to effective patent life. Over time, generic launch lags decline in some 
countries, including France, Germany and the U.K., reflecting more rapid entry possibly in 
response to pro-generic policies. Generic launch lags increased in Italy, Spain, Brazil and 
Mexico, possibly reflecting fewer copy products as enforcement of IP improved. In the U.S. the 
mean generic lag increased minimally, from 11.2 in 2001 to 11.4 in 2009. This suggests that any 
                                                            
16 A small number of generic launches reportedly occurred within 5 years of the originator launch. We treated such 
early launch dates as implausible and excluded them from these calculations in all countries except Brazil, Chile, 
Mexico, Italy, and Spain, which had late or weak patent enforcement.  16 
 
increase in Paragraph IV patent challenges was on average offset by increased use of exclusivity 
extensions, such as for pediatric trials. Effective patent life is almost two years longer in the US 
(11.3 years) than in Canada (9.4 years).  
Once generic entry occurs, in most countries the number of generic manufacturers 
increases initially and reaches a plateau roughly two years from first generic entry (Figure 3). 
Germany has the most generic manufacturers per presentation, averaging 9 by quarter 5, 
followed by France and Japan at 5-6, all traditionally branded generic markets. By contrast, the 
U.S. averages 4-5 generic manufacturers per presentation. Although Brazil and Mexico have a 
high proportion of molecules with generic presence, they have relatively few (1-2) generics per 
presentation.  
This evidence of more generics per presentation in countries other than the U.S. is prima 
facie surprising because the U.S. has much larger sales, by value or volume, than other countries 
(Table 2-3). Country-specific studies (e.g. Scott Morton, 1999) have consistently found a strong 
relationship between number of generic entrants and sales, consistent with standard entry models 
with fixed costs (Bresnahan and Reiss, 1991). This cross-national evidence of more 
manufacturers per presentation in much smaller markets than the US implies that the gross sales 
value necessary to attract generic entry is lower in other countries, plausibly due to higher 
expected generic prices and less price-competitive generic markets in other countries.  
To provide evidence on this, Table 3 shows median annual sales per generic 
manufacturer and price per dose at 2 years since generic entry, overall and by number of generics 
per presentation. All other countries (except Japan) have lower overall average gross sales per 
generic manufacturer and higher average price per dose than the U.S., followed by the U.K.
17 
Price per dose is relatively high ($0.88) in the U.S. for presentations with only one generic, 
which would primarily reflect paragraph IV exclusive markets. However, for the typical 
presentation with at least 4 generics, the U.S. average price ($0.23) is lower than all other 
countries except the U.K. ($0.22). Conversely, Canada has the highest generic prices and lowest 
sales per manufacturer, plausibly due to regulatory barriers to price competition. The decline in 
average generic price with number of manufacturers is greater in the U.S. and the U.K. than in 
other countries – indeed, the relationship is positive or flat in Canada, Italy, Japan and Mexico. 
                                                            
17 Japanese price are lower on a per dose basis because average grams of active ingredient per dose are consistently 
lower in Japan than in most other countries (Danzon and Furukawa, 2008).  17 
 
This evidence is consistent with the branded and/or price-regulated generic markets being less 
price competitive than the U.S. and U.K., enabling generics firms to survive on lower gross sales 
per presentation than is feasible in the more price competitive U.S. or U.K. markets.
18 
Figure 4 shows the life-cycle of normalized generic prices by quarter since first generic 
entry.
19 In the U.S., generic prices are initially 75 percent of baseline originator price, consistent 
with limited competition during the paragraph IV exclusivity period. Thereafter, generic prices 
drop rapidly to 36 percent of baseline originator price after two years. The U.K., Germany and 
Mexico also have declining generic prices after generic entry but at higher levels – declining 
after two years to 60 percent of the originator price in the U.K., 50 percent in Germany and 72 
percent in Mexico. In all other countries, generic prices are relatively flat over time, at 50-70 
percent of baseline originator prices, despite entry of more competitors shown in Figure 3. This 
evidence of relatively high normalized price levels that are flat over time despite competitive 
entry is consistent with the hypothesis of weak price competition in physician-driven, branded 
generic markets, despite multiple generic competitors per presentation.  
  Figure 5 shows that normalized originator prices are generally stable in response to 
generic entry, but at different levels reflecting different regulatory regimes. In the U.S., the mean 
normalized originator price is 1.24 at generic entry, reflecting the increase in real originator 
prices over time prior to patent expiration that is common in the U.S.
20 However, whereas some 
earlier studies found that originator prices increase in response to generic entry (Frank and 
Salkever, 1997; Regan, 2008), our results show a modest decline in originator prices after 
generic entry in the U.S. from 1.24 to 1.13, possibly reflecting the smaller size of the brand loyal 
market in recent years compared to the time of these earlier studies. In Germany and France, 
originator prices decline by 21 and 12 percent, respectively, in the 2 years post generic entry, 
plausibly reflecting the incentive of originators to cut prices to the reference price in these 
countries. In most other countries originator prices are stable over the two years following 
                                                            
18 These IMS prices may be upward biased for true transactions prices in countries where off-invoice discounts to 
pharmacies are common. These discounts average over 30 percent in the U.S. (CBO, 2005). The fact that gross sales 
per generic are smaller in other countries than in the U.S. makes it unlikely that any unobserved discounts are 
greater in other countries than the U.S. 
19 Recall that normalization is to the earliest originator price available in our dataset  (“baseline originator price”), 
which is invariant over time for each presentation. Although these baseline originator prices are observed at different 
originator ages, including some that occur after generic entry, given the stability of originator prices (see Figure 5) 
this should not matter. Moreover the normalization is invariant over time for a given presentation, so measures of 
generic price change over time are unaffected by differences across molecules in the baseline originator age. 
20 Recall that we deflate all nominal prices by the country-specific general Producer Price Index. 18 
 
generic entry, between 70-90 percent of baseline prices (except 60 percent for Italy), consistent 
with regulatory constraints on price increases and possibly some mandatory cuts. .  
Conditional on generic entry, generic penetration is most rapid and reaches the highest 
peak in the U.S. (89 percent of unit volume in two years), followed by Canada (74 percent) 
(Figure 6). High generic penetration in Canada, despite its high regulated generic prices, is 
consistent with the hypothesis of extensive off-invoice discounting to pharmacies that is not 
captured by payers or in the IMS data. Ontario has recently taken steps to change this system.
21 
The U.K. also has relatively rapid generic adoption due to strong pharmacy substitution 
incentives. In Germany the rapid generic adoption presumably reflect both drug budgets for 
physicians and requirements for generic substitution adopted during the 2000s. Japan and Italy 
have the lowest generic shares (under 40 percent).  
Over the 2000’s, most countries experienced growth in generic uptake, primarily due to 
growth in unbranded generics (Figure 7). Of the four E.U. countries that adopted significant pro-
generic policy changes (France, Germany, Italy and Spain) all started with relatively high 
branded generic shares in 2000 but achieved growth in unbranded and total generic penetration 
over time, except Italy, where growth in unbranded share is more than offset by decline in 
branded generic share. Although at the start of the period only the U.S., Canada and the U.K. had 
predominantly unbranded generics, by the end this was also true for France, Germany, and 
Spain. By contrast, Brazil and Mexico remain predominantly branded, and Japan is roughly 
evenly split, but with a very low generic share.  
 
B. Multivariate Regressions  
 
Appendix Tables 2-5 report the full regression analysis of determinants of generic entry, 
generic and originator prices and generic market shares, for branded and unbranded generics 
combined, to conserve space. Summary Tables 4-7 report key coefficients, including coefficients 
with branded and unbranded generics measured separately. We estimate separate equations for 
each country, to permit all coefficients to vary across countries. The unit of observation is the 
country-quarter-presentation (molecule-formulation-strength). We report marginal effects with 
robust standard errors and clustering by molecule to address unobserved molecule-specific 
effects. Some explanatory variables that are treated as pre-determined are lagged two quarters.  
                                                            
21 See http://www.mercer.ca/referencecontent.htm?idContent=1377645&siteLanguage=1007, accessed 6/24/2011. 19 
 
We report probit estimates for the Any Generic equation and use a negative binomial estimator 
for the Number of Generics equation. Results are robust to alternative estimation methods, including OLS 
and zero-inflated negative binomial models.
 22  To address the potential endogeneity of price in the 
volume share equations for countries where generic prices are determined by market competition 
(especially the U.S. and U.K.), we estimated both OLS and two-stage least squares (2SLS) via 
generalized method of moments (GMM). Instrumental variables are generic price in the hospital 
channel and an indicator for therapeutic classes that treat chronic conditions. These results are 
reported below the OLS estimates in Table 4.  
1.  Any Generic and Number of Generics  
The probability of Any Generic and Number of Generic manufacturers conditional on 
entry are both positively related to lagged log sales in almost all countries (Table 4), consistent 
with standard theories of entry in markets with fixed costs and evidence from previous studies. 
The exception is that Any Generic is not significantly related to sales in the U.S., suggesting that 
even small markets attract generic entry. In the traditionally physician-driven, branded generic 
markets of France, Germany, Spain and Italy, the responsiveness of entry to sales is higher for 
unbranded generics than for branded generics, as expected if unbranded generics are typically 
lower priced and therefore need larger sales volume to break even.  
The evidence in Appendix Tables 2-3 suggests that proliferation of licensee brands by the 
originator does deter entry of any generic in Italy, consistent with Magazzini et al. (2004), but 
not in other countries.
23  There is no support for the hypothesis that licensees reduce the Number 
of Generics, conditional on entry, in any country. Thus, this more recent evidence conflicts with 
earlier findings for Canada (Hollis, 2003) and Germany (Appelt, 2009), possibly because a brand 
saturation strategy becomes ineffective as a generic entry deterrent as generic markets become 
more unbranded and pharmacy-driven, as competition shifts to price rather than brand.
24  
                                                            
22 We do not estimate a hazard model for generic launch because defining the starting point is conceptually and 
empirically problematic, given that patents can be challenged, and we lack data on expected expiry dates for patents 
and data exclusivities. 
23 The marginally significant negative coefficient on licensees in the Any Generic equation for the U.S. is probably 
spurious. Licensee proliferation is irrational in a market dominated by pharmacy substitution, and co-branding is 
extremely rare in the US. The mean number of licensees in the U.S. (0.42) compared to Italy (0.76) and Germany 
(0.86) is consistent with the hypothesis that licensing co-branded pseudo-competitors is a less common strategy for 
originators in the U.S. than in physician-driven, branded generic markets.  
24 The significantly positive licensee coefficients for Number of Generics in Spain and Brazil may reflect coding 
error, because licensees in these countries may be local branded generics manufacturers. 20 
 
The originator defense strategy of launching alternative formulations shortly prior to 
patent expiry does deter any generic entry in the U.S. and also reduces number of generic 
entrants in the U.S. and Canada, but not in other countries. This evidence that launching new 
formulations is uniquely effective in the U.S. (and partially effective in Canada) is consistent 
with the hypothesis that U.S. reimbursement systems facilitate both switching patients and 
maintaining high prices for these new forms, compared to price-regulated markets which often 
reimburse new formulations at the same price as older versions of the same molecule under 
reference pricing.  
Extended release, intravenous, topical and other complex formulations are much less 
likely to attract generic entry than oral solids in multiple countries, plausibly due to higher 
manufacturing and possibly regulatory costs. OTC market share of the presentation does not 
deter Any Generic entry but does reduce number of generic entrants in the U.S., plausibly 
because OTC prices are relatively cheap in the U.S. and hence offer consumers a popular 
alternative to generic Rx versions, although the OTC forms are not covered by insurance. OTC 
effects are also negative for France. Hospital share of sales is negatively related to Any Generic 
and Number of Generics in most countries.
25 This suggests that hospitals markets are less 
attractive to generics than retail pharmacy sales, possibly because originators give large price 
discounts to hospitals in most countries, including in countries that regulate retail prices.
26 
Molecule Global Age is positively related to Any Generic and Number of Generics, 
confirming that this variable is a rough proxy for unobserved patent terms. Delay in originator 
launch is negatively related to Any Generic and Number of Generics in the U.S., with less 
consistent effects in other countries, suggesting that data exclusivities that run from country-
specific molecule launch are a more binding barrier to generic entry in the U.S. Global Diffusion 
of a molecule is positively associated with Number of Generics in Canada, Germany, Spain, 
Brazil and Mexico, suggesting that availability of foreign supplies of active ingredients and/or 
finished product facilitates generic entry in these countries, because local generic firms rely on 
foreign suppliers.  
    
                                                            
25 The IMS data do not report hospital sales for the Latin American countries.  
26 Scott-Morton (1999) found a positive relation between hospital share and generic entry. Magazzini et al. (2004) 
found a negative relation between hospital share and unbranded generic share in a regression that pooled 4 countries, 
including the U.S.  21 
 
2.  Prices 
Normalized Generic Prices: Previous studies of U.S. generic markets have consistently shown 
that generic prices decline with number of generic competitors. Whether price competition works 
as effectively for physician-driven, branded generics markets and how this has changed over 
time are important empirical questions addressed in Appendix Table 4, summarized in Table 5.  
Normalized generic prices are negatively related to number of unbranded generics in 
most countries, and unbranded generics are more effective at reducing prices than branded 
generics in Germany, Italy, Spain, Brazil and Mexico, as predicted. Prices are unrelated to 
number of competitors in France, suggesting that the reference price system and other 
regulations may have blunted price competition. In Japan, generic prices are negatively related 
only to branded generics, possibly because unbranded generics are still uncommon. Unbranded 
and branded generics have similar and large negative effects on price (0.076 and 0.097 percent, 
respectively) in the U.K., where aggressive pharmacy substitution plausibly forces both branded 
and unbranded generics to compete on price. In Canada an additional branded or unbranded 
generic reduces generic price by only 0.01 percent, plausibly due to regulation of generic prices 
that applies to both unbranded and branded generics. In Mexico generic prices are positively 
related to number of branded suppliers. 
  Normalized Originator Prices: Consistent with our graphical analysis, multivariate 
regression analysis shows no evidence that originator prices increase with number of generics in 
the U.S. (Table 5), contrary to segmentation theory and previous evidence (Frank and Salkever, 
1997; Regan 2008). The measured effect for number of unbranded generics is negative but very 
small (0.006) and only marginally significant in the U.S. By contrast, originator prices are 
negatively related to the number of unbranded generics but number of branded generics has no 
effect in France, Italy and Spain. This suggests that the reference pricing systems in these 
countries have brought down originator prices and, together with other measures, have 
encouraged the entry of unbranded generics that compete on price.  
 
3.  Generic Volume Shares   
Table 6 reports effects of generic prices on generic volume shares for OLS and 2SLS-
GMM estimators. Endogeneity of generic prices is plausible in the U.S. and the U.K., where 
generic prices are unregulated and generics compete on price to gain market share. The 2SLS 22 
 
estimates pass tests for instrument validity and overidentification in all countries. For other 
countries where generic prices are either regulated or constrained by reference pricing, and 
competition focused on brand rather than price at least initially, prices are less endogenous to 
share, and OLS results may be plausible. For most countries the OLS and 2SLS results are 
similar, with 2SLS showing slightly more negative share elasticities than OLS, especially in 
Canada.
27  
Generic volume shares are significantly negatively related to generic prices in the U.S., 
the U.K. and Canada, the three countries with pharmacy-driven generic markets throughout the 
period, and also in France and Germany, which adopted measures to stimulate switching to 
cheaper generics over the 2000’s. The estimated elasticity of volume with respect to price for 
Canada is much more negative using 2SLS (-1.114) than OLS (-0.382), which suggests that the 
hospital generic price we use as an instrument is a more accurate indicator of the true ex-
manufacturer price to pharmacists, net of unobserved discounts, than the official retail price 
reported in the IMS retail data.  
Generic price has no significant effect on generic share in Italy, Spain and Japan. The 
lack of price sensitivity is unsurprising in Japan, because physicians’ absolute dispensing 
margins tend to increase with drug price. Lack of price sensitivity in Italy and Spain may reflect 
reference price reimbursement systems that encourage originators to drop their price to the 
reference price (Garratini and Ghislandi, 2006), thereby eliminating financial incentive for 
physicians/patients/pharmacists to prefer generics. The estimated OLS effect of generic price on 
share is positive in Mexico, despite its predominantly self-pay market. This is consistent with the 
hypothesis that consumers purchase on brand rather than price when quality is uncertain due to 
lack bioequivalence requirements (Danzon, Mulcahy and Towse, 2011).  
Generic shares are also positively related to Generic Age (years since generic entry), 
consistent with standard diffusion models. Controlling for price, generic shares are positively 
related to number of generic manufacturers in most countries; however, we treat this primarily as 




27 For Brazil and Mexico, 2SLS cannot be estimated due to lack of data on hospital price which is used as an 
instrument. 23 
 
4.  Effects of Policy Changes 
To provide a rough measure of the effects on generic entry, prices and shares due to 
policy changes and other factors over our time period, the regressions include two indicator 
variables, for years 2002-2005 and years 2006-2009, with the initial period 1998-2001 as the 
referent. Table 7 reports the coefficients on the 2006-2009 indicators, with tests for significance 
of change relative to the initial period.  
  The probability of Any Generic has increased significantly in the U.S.,
28 the U.K., France 
and Germany, all of which have adopted measures to promote generic entry. Number of generic 
manufacturers per presentation, conditional on entry, has increased significantly in France, 
Germany, Italy and Brazil, with positive but less significant effects in Spain and Mexico. 
Interestingly, the number of branded generic manufacturers has declined significantly in the 
U.K., Germany, Italy, Spain and Japan, while the number of unbranded generic manufacturers 
has increased significantly in all countries except the U.S., U.K. and Canada, which had strong 
unbranded generic presence and pharmacy-driven markets initially, and Mexico. Thus, the policy 
changes have clearly had some success in promoting entry of unbranded generics.  
Normalized generic prices have declined in all countries except in the U.S., which 
already had very low generic prices. The large decline in U.K. generic prices plausibly reflects 
the changes in generic reimbursement adopted in 2005. Normalized originator prices declined in 
all countries except the U.S. and Mexico, where they increased, and Canada with no change.  
Generic share of volume, conditional on generic presence, has increased significantly in 
the U.S., U.K., France, (Japan) and Brazil. With the exception of Brazil, this generic share 
growth is due almost entirely to unbranded generics, which have also had very modest share 
growth in Japan. Thus, the policy changes in the E.U. countries appear to have increased the 
number of generics and their market share, with greatest growth (18.8 percent) in France. The 
U.S. and the U.K. have also seen 18.2 and 15.5 percent, respectively, increase in generic market 
shares. The largest decline in generic prices was in the U.K. (33 percent), followed by France, 





28 The U.S. 2003 MMA limited originator incentives to use patent proliferation to deter generic entry, by permitting 
only one 30 month stay per product.  24 
 
VII.  Savings from Generics 
 
Payer savings from generics depends on the generic-originator price difference and on the 
share of prescriptions that are dispensed generically.
29 We calculate the percent savings from 
generic price, generic unit volume and generic savings as a percent of total drug spending in 
1998-2001 and 2006-2009, calculated as follows (where Q denotes units, P denotes price, 






G), measures the counterfactual percent increase in cost if all generically-








O), is the generic share of unit volume for molecules in our 8-20 year cohort, weighted by 









O), measures how much higher expenditure would be if there were no generics for drugs in 
the 8-20 year cohort. An alternative Total savings measure calculates the generic savings for the 
8-20 year cohort as a percent of total expenditure on all drugs. The estimates for each time period 
and country are in Table 8, which also reports the change in savings between the early and later 
periods.  
  Savings from low generic prices are far greater in the U.S. than in any other country in 
2001, but by 2009 the U.K. prices yield similar savings and the U.K. therefore has the greatest 
increase in price savings over the period. Of course, these estimates are sensitive to the originator 
prices, which are relatively high in the U.S., but the U.S. generic prices are also absolutely low 
relative to other countries (Table 3).  
  The savings from generic share of unit volume increased most in France, from 7 percent 
in 2001 to 55 percent in 2009. As of 2009, generic shares of the 8-20 year cohort total volume 
are higher in Canada, the U.K., France and Germany than in the U.S., because although the U.S. 
has the highest generic penetration conditional on generic entry, Canada, France and Germany 
on average have earlier generic entry, presumably due to fewer patent extensions for originators. 
Thus although Paragraph IV challenges have shortened expected patent life for some drugs, 
                                                            
29 Our savings calculations ignore any change in total (originator plus generics) unit volume of the molecule 
following generic entry. In theory lower generic prices might induce increased utilization of molecules with 
generics, including therapeutic substitution away from similar, on-patent molecules. In practice, U.S. evidence 
generally indicates no increase in utilization at the molecule level following generic entry, plausibly because any 
positive response to lower prices is offset by the decline in originator promotion that occurs in markets with 
pharmacy substitution, unless payers aggressively encourage therapeutic substitution, as some payers did when 
generic simvastatin became available in the statin class.  25 
 
originators in the U.S. on average lose less volume share to generics than originators in these 
other countries in the 8-20 year phase of originator life. Relatively high originator prices in the 
denominator also reduce our measure of volume savings for the U.S.  
The total generic savings on the 8-20 year cohort are highest in the U.K. and the U.S., 
which would have spent 272 percent and 238 percent more, respectively, on these drugs, in the 
absence of generics. Canada, France and Germany would have spent 43-55 percent more, in the 
absence of generics. Among the E.U. countries which made major changes, only France has 
significant increase in savings (39.3 percentage points) from 1998-2009. In Germany savings on 
price and total savings appear to have declined, even though volume share increased; however, 
price savings in Germany may be understated if the discounts granted directly to sickness funds 
are not reflect in IMS price data. Spain has modest declines in price and volume savings from 
generics, possibly because reference pricing has reduced prices but increased volume share for 
originators. And such savings, due to the effect of generics on originator prices, are not reflected 
in our estimates of savings due to generics.  
Generic savings as a share of total drug spending is under 10 percent in all countries 
except the U.S. and U.K. However, this measure is heavily influenced by on-patent originator 
prices in the denominator, which reflect policies to encourage R&D and other factors. This Total 
savings measure is therefore less relevant as a measure of savings achieved by policies to 
encourage generics than the measures which report savings relative to total sales for the 8-20 
year cohort.  
 
VIII.  Conclusions 
 
Cross-national differences in policies towards generics have resulted in major differences 
in generic entry, generic prices and generic market shares, and in whether generic markets are 
pharmacy-driven with unbranded generics, as in the U.S. and U.K., or physician driven with 
branded generics, as has traditionally been the norm in most other countries. Over the last 
decade, policies adopted in France, Spain, Italy and Germany to increase generic uptake and 
price-competitiveness have resulted in some growth in the share of unbranded generics in these 
countries. Reference pricing policies may have stunted the growth of generic shares and price 
competition, although to the extent that they also reduce originator prices, they yield savings 
without generic adoption. As of 2009, the policy changes appear to have been most effective in 26 
 
France, which experienced a large increase in generic penetration and some reduction in generic 
prices, whereas incremental savings were at most modest in Italy, Spain and Germany. The 
U.K.’s policies to reduce generic reimbursement prices have also achieved very significant price 
savings and increased generic penetration. Although the data do not permit precise measurement 
of individual policy effects, these results are consistent with the hypothesis that policies to shift 
generic markets from physician-driven, branded generics towards pharmacy driven, unbranded 
generics, can potentially yield significant savings to payers, provided that these policies are 
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US  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  No 
UK  Yes 
1  No  Yes  Yes  No  No  Yes 
Canada  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  No 
France  1999  Pre 2002  Yes  2003  Yes  No  2000
2 
Germany  2002  Pre 2007 
Banned in 
2006  1989  No  No  Yes 
Italy  2001  Yes  No  2001  Yes  No  No 
Spain  Yes  No  Yes  2000  No  No  No 
Japan  No  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  No 
Australia  1994  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  No 
Mexico  No
3  No  No  No  No  Yes  No 
Chile  No  No  No  No  No  Yes  No 
Brazil  Yes  No  No  No  2004  Yes  No 
 
1 INN Rx only for outpatient Rx; also substitution for originator Rx in hospitals. 
 2 From 2000, French physicians were required to prescribe at least a specified percent generic, 
which has increased over time. 
3Substitution permitted only with interchangeable generics, which were a small share of total 
volume until 2005, and if the prescription is generically written. Since over 60% of Rx-bound 









































































































Figure 1: Percent of Molecules with Any Generic






































































Figure 2: Mean Molecule Age at Generic Entry (Generic Launch Lag)


















































Quarters Since First Generic Entry
Note: Sample includes molecules with global age 8-20 years
Figure 3: Generic Manufacturers, By Time Since First Generic Entry





































































Quarters Since First Generic Entry
Note: Sample includes molecules with global age 8-20 years
Figure 4: Normalized Generic Price, By Time Since First Generic Entry






































































Quarters Since First Generic Entry
Note: Sample includes molecules with global age 8-20 years
Figure 5: Normalized Originator Price, By Time Since First Generic Entry











































Quarters Since First Generic Entry
Note: Sample includes molecules with global age 8-20 years
Figure 6: Generic Share of Volume, By Time Since First Generic Entry










































































Figure 7: Generic Share of Volume, 24 Months Since First Generic Entry






Table 2: Pharmaceutical Sales and Unit Volume
U.S. U.K. Canada France Germany Italy Spain Japan Brazil Mexico
Sales
Total market $326,438 $24,001 $21,564 $51,742 $52,615 $31,731 $26,375 $111,732 $21,731 $13,992
Retail market
1 160,840 12,165 11,701 16,672 16,218 10,135 13,410 38,239 5,877 4,260
Generic market 40,459 4,662 5,307 4,228 6,845 2,875 3,734 9,510 3,562 1,843
Sample cohort
2 83,333 3,852 3,966 5,101 4,515 2,841 3,219 14,923 797 763
Generic market 6,324 615 953 654 1,126 264 414 354 354 88
Unit volume
Total market 505,325 114,274 79,097 147,957 158,167 66,998 71,519 339,007 124,123 62,118
Retail market
1 170,899 45,738 31,764 39,630 39,317 28,335 35,026 135,878 20,394 7,649
Generic market 128,555 31,540 25,500 19,264 30,357 13,125 17,246 76,733 14,424 4,627
Sample cohort
2 41,574 9,107 5,234 9,219 9,898 7,461 7,689 28,563 2,258 750
Generic market 18,215 5,150 1,991 2,260 6,313 1,212 2,223 1,545 1,331 178
Generic % sales
Retail market
1 25.2 38.3 45.4 25.4 42.2 28.4 27.8 24.9 60.6 43.3
Sample cohort
2 7.6 16.0 24.0 12.8 24.9 9.3 12.9 2.4 44.4 11.6
Generic % volume
Retail market
1 75.2 69.0 80.3 48.6 77.2 46.3 49.2 56.5 70.7 60.5
Sample cohort
2 43.8 56.5 38.0 24.5 63.8 16.2 28.9 5.4 58.9 23.8
Sales ($USD) and unit volume are reported in millions for the 12 months ending June 2009. 
1Retail market excludes combination products, 
biologics, OTC, and hospital channel. 
2Sample cohort includes molecules with global age 8-20 years.
Table 3: Market Size and Generic Entry
Median annual sales ($USD, M, 2009 exchange rates) and mean generic price per dose ($USD) at 24-27 months since generic entry
U.S. U.K. Canada France Germany Italy Spain Japan Brazil Mexico
Per generic manufacturer
Annual sales 3.99 2.88 1.11 2.00 1.02 2.66 1.96 4.03 1.87 1.16
P r i c e   p e r   d o s e 0 . 3 60 . 3 70 . 5 70 . 3 90 . 3 80 . 4 90 . 4 30 . 3 00 . 4 9 1 . 0 0
1 generic manufacturer
Annual sales 2.41 2.06 1.58 2.50 5.40 5.49 3.67 1.59 2.30 1.09
P r i c e   p e r   d o s e 0 . 8 80 . 4 40 . 5 10 . 6 70 . 9 30 . 5 60 . 6 00 . 2 70 . 4 9 0 . 9 2
2 or 3 generic manufacturers
Annual sales 11.02 5.22 3.25 3.94 1.76 2.24 5.72 8.27 8.39 3.01
P r i c e   p e r   d o s e 0 . 4 70 . 4 70 . 5 90 . 3 00 . 4 00 . 2 40 . 4 40 . 3 10 . 4 7 1 . 3 2
4+ generic manufacturers
Annual sales 34.0 18.0 6.11 20.4 11.37 13.4 16.66 50.3 5.30 6.88
Price per dose 0.23 0.22 0.57 0.40 0.32 0.52 0.37 0.32 0.45 1.03








Table 4: Effects of Market Size on Any Generic Entry and No. of Generic Manufacturers
Dependent variable: Any generic entry
U.S. U.K. Canada France Germany Italy Spain Japan Brazil Mexico
lnSales 0.003 0.028*** 0.024*** 0.020*** 0.043*** 0.033*** 0.036*** 0.039*** 0.055*** 0.008
Dependent variable: No. of generic manufacturers, conditional on generic entry
U.S. U.K. Canada France Germany Italy Spain Japan Brazil Mexico
lnSales 0.715*** 0.340*** 0.566*** 1.588*** 2.581*** 0.663*** 0.981*** 1.825*** 1.115*** 0.421***
Dependent variable: No. of branded generic manufacturers, conditional on generic entry
U.S. U.K. Canada France Germany Italy Spain Japan Brazil Mexico
lnSales 0.003 0.017 0.211*** 0.223** 0.904*** 0.279*** 0.210** 1.392*** 0.937*** 0.397***
Dependent variable: No. of unbranded generic manufacturers, conditional on generic entry
U.S. U.K. Canada France Germany Italy Spain Japan Brazil Mexico
lnSales 0.712*** 0.312*** 0.352*** 1.437*** 1.804*** 1.124** 1.196*** 0.501*** 0.338*** 0.083**
Marginal effects from Probit and Negative-Binomial regressions, clustered by molecule; robust standard errors in brackets, 
significant at ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10
Table 5: Effects of No. of Generic Manufacturers on Normalized Generic and Originator Price
U.S. U.K. Canada France Germany Italy Spain Japan Brazil Mexico
GenMfrBrand 0.029 -0.097*** -0.014** -0.014 -0.009** 0.002 -0.006 -0.010*** -0.006** 0.038*
GenMfrUnbr -0.043*** -0.076*** -0.011** -0.006 -0.015*** -0.043*** -0.013*** 0.001 -0.012** -0.080**
U.S. U.K. Canada France Germany Italy Spain Japan Brazil Mexico
GenMfrBrand 0.107 -0.024 -0.020** -0.001 -0.017* 0.000 -0.002 -0.004*** -0.010*** 0.005
GenMfrUnbr -0.006* -0.004 -0.001 -0.013*** -0.006 -0.031*** -0.017*** -0.003*** -0.010* -0.010
Marginal effects from OLS regressions, clustered by molecule; robust standard errors in brackets, significant at ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, 
Dependent variable: Normalized generic price
Dependent variable: Normalized originator price
Dependent variable: Generic share of volume
U.S. U.K. Canada France Germany Italy Spain Japan Brazil Mexico
GenPrice
1 -0.144*** -0.228*** -0.382*** -0.262* -0.202** 0.039 -0.068 0.050 -0.346*** 0.140**
GenPrice
2 -0.207*** -0.224*** -1.111*** -0.425** -0.371*** 0.002 -0.019 0.038 n/a n/a
Table 6: Effects of Normalized Generic Price on Generic Share of Volume
Marginal effects from 
1OLS and 
22SLS-GMM regressions, clustered by molecule; robust standard errors in brackets, significant at 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10. n/a, instrumental variables not available.35 
 
 
Dependent variable: Any generic entry
U.S. U.K. Canada France Germany Italy Spain Japan Brazil Mexico
Years 2006-2009 0.147*** 0.091*** -0.008 0.097*** 0.071** -0.046 -0.133*** 0.046 -0.043 -0.012
Dependent variable: No. of generic manufacturers, conditional on generic entry
U.S. U.K. Canada France Germany Italy Spain Japan Brazil Mexico
Years 2006-2009 0.385 -0.199 0.497 3.803*** 2.612** 1.867** 1.739* -0.347 1.479*** 0.570*
Dependent variable: No. of branded generic manufacturers, conditional on generic entry
U.S. U.K. Canada France Germany Italy Spain Japan Brazil Mexico
Years 2006-2009 0.039 -0.237*** 0.652* -0.497 -1.125** -0.785*** -1.448*** -2.325*** 0.034 0.601*
Dependent variable: No. of unbranded generic manufacturers, conditional on generic entry
U.S. U.K. Canada France Germany Italy Spain Japan Brazil Mexico
Years 2006-2009 0.352 0.183 -0.023 4.472*** 3.855*** 8.680*** 7.618*** 2.738*** 4.434*** 0.057
Dependent variable: Normalized generic price
U.S. U.K. Canada France Germany Italy Spain Japan Brazil Mexico
Years 2006-2009 0.011 -0.331*** -0.092*** -0.250*** -0.151*** -0.298*** -0.277*** -0.128*** -0.273*** -0.129**
Dependent variable: Normalized originator price
U.S. U.K. Canada France Germany Italy Spain Japan Brazil Mexico
Years 2006-2009 0.044** -0.139*** -0.007 -0.149*** -0.156*** -0.279*** -0.221*** -0.169*** -0.176*** 0.047**
Dependent variable: Generic share of volume
U.S. U.K. Canada France Germany Italy Spain Japan Brazil Mexico
Years 2006-2009 0.182*** 0.155*** 0.010 0.188*** 0.001 -0.046 -0.021 0.033* 0.181*** 0.070
Dependent variable: Branded generic share of volume
U.S. U.K. Canada France Germany Italy Spain Japan Brazil Mexico
Years 2006-2009 0.008 0.014 0.046 0.036** -0.018 -0.033 0.049 0.014 0.090* 0.032
Dependent variable: Unbranded generic share of volume
U.S. U.K. Canada France Germany Italy Spain Japan Brazil Mexico
Years 2006-2009 0.174*** 0.141** -0.035 0.152*** 0.019 -0.014 -0.070** 0.019*** 0.090** 0.038***
Period dummies for years 1998-2001 (omitted), 2002-2006, 2007-2009. Significant at ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10




Table 8: Savings from Generics
U.S. U.K. Canada France Germany Italy Spain Japan Brazil Mexico
P1: Years 1998-2001 4.439 0.556 1.358 0.578 1.109 0.085 0.375 0.750 0.490 0.222
P2: Years 2002-2005 3.051 0.798 0.718 0.648 0.710 0.135 0.326 0.658 0.927 0.355
P3: Years 2006-2009 4.554 4.091 0.796 0.790 0.807 0.148 0.192 0.664 1.353 1.194
% diff. P3-P1 0.115 3.535 -0.562 0.212 -0.302 0.063 -0.183 -0.085 0.863 0.973
U.S. U.K. Canada France Germany Italy Spain Japan Brazil Mexico
P1: Years 1998-2001 0.372 0.430 0.463 0.070 0.562 0.234 0.440 0.033 0.364 0.254
P2: Years 2002-2005 0.542 0.635 0.659 0.302 0.662 0.231 0.408 0.044 0.608 0.291
P3: Years 2006-2009 0.521 0.664 0.691 0.549 0.621 0.240 0.393 0.064 0.719 0.285
% diff. P3-P1 0.150 0.234 0.228 0.479 0.059 0.007 -0.047 0.031 0.355 0.031
U.S. U.K. Canada France Germany Italy Spain Japan Brazil Mexico
P1: Years 1998-2001 1.651 0.239 0.629 0.041 0.623 0.020 0.165 0.025 0.178 0.056
P2: Years 2002-2005 1.655 0.507 0.473 0.196 0.470 0.031 0.133 0.029 0.564 0.103
P3: Years 2006-2009 2.375 2.715 0.550 0.433 0.501 0.036 0.076 0.043 0.972 0.340
% diff. P3-P1 0.724 2.476 -0.079 0.393 -0.122 0.016 -0.090 0.018 0.794 0.284
U.S. U.K. Canada France Germany Italy Spain Japan Brazil Mexico
P1: Years 1998-2001 0.025 0.008 0.048 0.001 0.052 0.002 0.032 0.002 0.028 0.004
P2: Years 2002-2005 0.065 0.061 0.035 0.010 0.062 0.003 0.018 0.003 0.079 0.007
P3: Years 2006-2009 0.201 0.235 0.053 0.029 0.049 0.003 0.007 0.005 0.063 0.020
% diff. P3-P1 0.176 0.227 0.005 0.028 -0.003 0.001 -0.026 0.003 0.035 0.016
Percent savings in prices
Percent share of unit volume
Total percent savings from generics, for the 8-20 year cohort
Total percent savings from generics, relative to total market37 
 
Appendix Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
U.S. N Mean STD Min Max
GenMfr 24,595 1.05 2.67 0 23
GenMfrBrand 24,595 0.02 0.13 0 1
GenMfrUnbr. 24,595 1.04 2.65 0 23
GenPrice 354 0.77 0.43 0.08 1.88
OrigPrice 4,751 1.14 0.34 0.02 2.47
GenShare 5,665 0.84 0.24 0.0000003 1.00
Sales 24,595 137,524,067 359,636,059 128 5,301,822,792
Licensees 24,595 0.42 0.50 0 2
OrigForms 24,595 0.58 0.85 0 4
OTC share 24,595 0.80 8.85 0 100.00
Hosp. share 24,595 22.37 32.57 0 99.98
Ext. release 24,595 0.06 0.24 0 1
IV form 24,595 0.20 0.40 0 1
Topical form 24,595 0.04 0.19 0 1
Other form 24,595 0.15 0.36 0 1
Global age 24,595 163.82 41.41 96 240
Molecule lag 24,572 24.72 32.18 0 204
GenAge 5,665 39.93 31.47 0 169
Global avail. 24,595 0.45 0.50 0 1
U.K. N Mean STD Min Max
GenMfr 19,554 0.40 1.00 0 7
GenMfrBrand 19,554 0.04 0.24 0 3
GenMfrUnbr. 19,554 0.36 0.89 0 6
GenPrice 661 0.54 0.32 0.01 1.00
OrigPrice 3,207 0.84 0.15 0.16 1.18
GenShare 3,580 0.62 0.32 0.000004 1.00
Sales 19,554 11,488,867 28,129,153 5 383,365,491
Licensees 19,554 0.29 0.48 0 2
OrigForms 19,554 0.86 1.03 0 4
OTC share 19,554 0.80 8.44 0 100.00
Hosp. share 19,554 26.40 36.91 0 100.00
Ext. release 19,554 0.04 0.20 0 1
IV form 19,554 0.12 0.33 0 1
Topical form 19,554 0.04 0.19 0 1
Other form 19,554 0.16 0.37 0 1
Global age 19,554 163.65 40.64 96 240
Molecule lag 19,554 19.23 31.78 0 213
GenAge 3,579 36.38 26.82 0 152
Global avail. 19,554 0.52 0.50 0 1  
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Appendix Table 1: Descriptive Statistics (Continued)
Canada N Mean STD Min Max
GenMfr 15,723 0.97 2.16 0 12
GenMfrBrand 15,723 0.33 0.99 0 6
GenMfrUnbr. 15,723 0.65 1.53 0 9
GenPrice 2,227 0.58 0.13 0.18 1.19
OrigPrice 3,524 0.91 0.15 0.03 2.10
GenShare 4,137 0.71 0.30 0.000007 1.00
Sales 15,723 11,220,881 29,250,230 13 360,446,191
Licensees 15,723 0.28 0.46 0 2
OrigForms 15,723 0.43 0.76 0 4
OTC share 15,723 0.06 2.52 0 100.00
Hosp. share 15,723 16.94 29.19 0 100.00
Ext. release 15,723 0.06 0.23 0 1
IV form 15,723 0.10 0.30 0 1
Topical form 15,723 0.05 0.21 0 1
Other form 15,723 0.17 0.37 0 1
Global age 15,723 162.85 40.80 96 240
Molecule lag 15,723 31.79 30.56 0 224
GenAge 3,997 52.37 37.43 0 158
Global avail. 15,723 0.56 0.50 0 1
France N Mean STD Min Max
GenMfr 14,510 0.66 2.40 0 16
GenMfrBrand 14,510 0.07 0.38 0 4
GenMfrUnbr. 14,510 0.59 2.22 0 16
GenPrice 506 0.65 0.34 0.18 2.37
OrigPrice 1,460 0.78 0.16 0.35 1.05
GenShare 1,590 0.41 0.33 0.0000004 1.00
Sales 13,296 20,115,626 48,705,099 33 726,745,404
Licensees 14,510 0.42 0.56 0 2
OrigForms 14,510 0.38 0.72 0 3
OTC share 14,510 0.48 6.74 0 100.00
Hosp. share 14,510 10.55 21.19 0 100.00
Ext. release 14,510 0.04 0.19 0 1
IV form 14,510 0.04 0.19 0 1
Topical form 14,510 0.06 0.23 0 1
Other form 14,510 0.18 0.38 0 1
Global age 14,510 167.34 40.79 96 240
Molecule lag 14,510 32.39 36.29 0 210
GenAge 1,574 25.42 17.85 0 101
Global avail. 14,510 0.47 0.50 0 1  
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Appendix Table 1: Descriptive Statistics (Continued)
Germany N Mean STD Min Max
GenMfr 24,390 2.02 5.52 0 41
GenMfrBrand 24,390 0.70 2.21 0 30
GenMfrUnbr. 24,390 1.34 3.82 0 34
GenPrice 4,092 0.54 0.29 0.01 1.25
OrigPrice 4,379 0.78 0.28 0.07 1.82
GenShare 5,203 0.65 0.32 0.000003 1.00
Sales 24,390 11,731,786 27,256,808 10 534,265,566
Licensees 24,390 0.86 1.67 0 13
OrigForms 24,390 0.92 1.05 0 5
OTC share 24,390 1.90 13.55 0 100.00
Hosp. share 24,390 17.19 30.46 0 99.99
Ext. release 24,390 0.04 0.20 0 1
IV form 24,390 0.18 0.38 0 1
Topical form 24,390 0.05 0.22 0 1
Other form 24,390 0.16 0.37 0 1
Global age 24,390 166.55 41.33 96 240
Molecule lag 24,390 22.87 29.40 0 225
GenAge 4,994 45.41 34.06 0 169
Global avail. 24,390 0.41 0.49 0 1
Italy N Mean STD Min Max
GenMfr 19,881 0.55 2.58 0 41
GenMfrBrand 19,881 0.29 1.48 0 32
GenMfrUnbr. 19,881 0.26 1.49 0 17
GenPrice 2,552 0.83 0.27 0.13 1.60
OrigPrice 2,722 0.80 0.27 0.13 1.44
GenShare 3,290 0.41 0.35 0.000002 1.00
Sales 19,881 11,712,076 25,519,945 6 244,190,237
Licensees 19,881 0.76 0.87 0 4
OrigForms 19,881 0.40 0.72 0 3
OTC share 19,881 3.07 16.86 0 100.00
Hosp. share 19,881 8.15 19.51 0 99.99
Ext. release 19,881 0.04 0.19 0 1
IV form 19,881 0.08 0.27 0 1
Topical form 19,881 0.06 0.24 0 1
Other form 19,881 0.24 0.43 0 1
Global age 19,881 170.00 40.61 96 240
Molecule lag 19,881 31.31 33.07 0 179
GenAge 3,290 110.32 63.35 0 239
Global avail. 19,881 0.41 0.49 0 1  
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Appendix Table 1: Descriptive Statistics (Continued)
Spain N Mean STD Min Max
GenMfr 19,481 1.50 4.50 0 52
GenMfrBrand 19,481 0.56 1.81 0 19
GenMfrUnbr. 19,481 0.97 3.41 0 38
GenPrice 4,319 0.72 0.23 0.05 1.12
OrigPrice 4,988 0.75 0.21 0.06 1.05
GenShare 5,775 0.45 0.34 0.000005 1.00
Sales 19,481 9,847,623 20,464,211 5 286,687,223
Licensees 19,481 0.66 0.78 0 4
OrigForms 19,481 0.43 0.75 0 3
OTC share 19,481 0.35 5.56 0 100.00
Hosp. share 19,481 9.62 25.04 0 100.00
Ext. release 19,481 0.04 0.19 0 1
IV form 19,481 0.08 0.26 0 1
Topical form 19,481 0.07 0.26 0 1
Other form 19,481 0.21 0.41 0 1
Global age 19,481 166.81 40.66 96 240
Molecule lag 19,481 37.69 34.16 0 202
GenAge 5,775 108.80 59.05 0 239
Global avail. 19,481 0.48 0.50 0 1
Japan N Mean STD Min Max
GenMfr 24,692 1.31 3.71 0 36
GenMfrBrand 24,692 1.00 2.92 0 28
GenMfrUnbr. 24,692 0.33 1.70 0 36
GenPrice 5,061 0.56 0.19 0.08 1.05
OrigPrice 5,526 0.91 0.11 0.60 1.12
GenShare 5,963 0.15 0.26 0.000004 1.00
Sales 24,690 36,489,426 89,855,117 34 1,429,952,122
Licensees 24,692 0.55 0.69 0 6
OrigForms 24,692 0.45 0.83 0 5
OTC share 24,692 0.63 7.34 0 100.00
Hosp. share 24,692 41.77 29.06 0 99.96
Ext. release 24,692 0.03 0.16 0 1
IV form 24,692 0.20 0.40 0 1
Topical form 24,692 0.05 0.23 0 1
Other form 24,692 0.09 0.28 0 1
Global age 24,692 171.69 40.91 96 240
Molecule lag 24,692 24.13 37.52 0 211
GenAge 5,666 52.09 37.40 0 177
Global avail. 24,692 0.27 0.44 0 1  
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Appendix Table 1: Descriptive Statistics (Continued)
Brazil N Mean STD Min Max
GenMfr 15,826 1.47 3.53 0 38
GenMfrBrand 15,826 1.10 2.80 0 33
GenMfrUnbr. 15,826 0.47 1.46 0 15
GenPrice 4,076 0.48 0.23 0.03 1.15
OrigPrice 4,239 0.68 0.19 0.14 1.23
GenShare 6,115 0.67 0.35 0.0003 1.00
Sales 15,826 3,518,583 7,132,281 409 78,588,090
Licensees 15,826 0.29 0.50 0 2
OrigForms 15,826 0.24 0.51 0 3
OTC share 15,826 0.42 6.21 0 100.00
Hosp. share n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Ext. release 15,826 0.05 0.21 0 1
IV form 15,826 0.15 0.36 0 1
Topical form 15,826 0.05 0.21 0 1
Other form 15,826 0.17 0.38 0 1
Global age 15,826 165.97 40.70 96 240
Molecule lag 15,804 46.04 37.10 0 189
GenAge 6,115 89.02 47.69 0 214
Global avail. 15,826 0.49 0.50 0 1
Mexico N Mean STD Min Max
GenMfr 16,437 0.66 1.98 0 28
GenMfrBrand 16,437 0.60 1.76 0 23
GenMfrUnbr. 16,437 0.10 0.53 0 10
GenPrice 2,738 0.82 0.36 0.11 3.70
OrigPrice 2,568 1.07 0.27 0.32 1.96
GenShare 3,726 0.50 0.40 0.000009 1.00
Sales 16,437 2,392,473 4,593,691 3 43,338,891
Licensees 16,437 0.32 0.51 0 4
OrigForms 16,437 0.40 0.78 0 4
OTC share 16,437 0.55 6.87 0 100.00
Hosp. share n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Ext. release 16,437 0.03 0.18 0 1
IV form 16,437 0.14 0.35 0 1
Topical form 16,437 0.06 0.24 0 1
Other form 16,437 0.20 0.40 0 1
Global age 16,437 166.74 40.82 96 240
Molecule lag 16,437 39.69 39.63 0 231
GenAge 3,726 89.26 56.57 0 222




Appendix Table 2: Regressions of Probability of Any Generic Entry on Market Size and Controls
U.S. U.K. Canada France Germany Italy Spain Japan Brazil Mexico
lnSales 0.003 0.028*** 0.024*** 0.020*** 0.043*** 0.033*** 0.036*** 0.039*** 0.055*** 0.008
[0.005] [0.005] [0.008] [0.004] [0.005] [0.008] [0.007] [0.005] [0.009] [0.007]
Licensees -0.061* -0.004 -0.017 -0.031 0.002 -0.040** 0.032 0.022 0.020 0.022
[0.031] [0.027] [0.041] [0.019] [0.006] [0.018] [0.031] [0.019] [0.040] [0.037]
Orig. forms -0.036** 0.010 -0.011 0.027** 0.029** -0.015 0.029 0.071*** 0.000 0.019
[0.018] [0.013] [0.032] [0.013] [0.014] [0.023] [0.033] [0.017] [0.036] [0.019]
OTC share 0.001** 0.001** 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.002** 0.001 0.003***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Hosp. share -0.001 -0.002*** -0.004*** -0.001* -0.001 -0.003*** -0.003** -0.001*
[0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Ext. release -0.149*** -0.123*** -0.219*** -0.088*** -0.134*** -0.102* -0.146** -0.053 -0.183** -0.177***
[0.029] [0.032] [0.035] [0.024] [0.039] [0.052] [0.065] [0.073] [0.076] [0.040]
IV form -0.031 -0.001 0.203* -0.025 -0.035 0.078 0.075 -0.112*** 0.230*** 0.000
[0.070] [0.051] [0.120] [0.046] [0.061] [0.091] [0.113] [0.038] [0.058] [0.052]
Topical form -0.183*** -0.180*** -0.259*** -0.085** -0.197*** -0.037 -0.133* -0.011 -0.215*** -0.144***
[0.029] [0.018] [0.027] [0.035] [0.022] [0.080] [0.070] [0.078] [0.058] [0.042]
Other form -0.161*** -0.178*** -0.183*** -0.113*** -0.139*** -0.014 -0.036 -0.083** 0.017 -0.044
[0.028] [0.021] [0.036] [0.021] [0.029] [0.031] [0.051] [0.033] [0.069] [0.037]
lnGlobalAge 0.813*** 0.640*** 0.624*** 0.443*** 0.604*** 0.362*** 0.540*** 0.617*** 0.612*** 0.434***
[0.054] [0.044] [0.071] [0.061] [0.050] [0.061] [0.069] [0.057] [0.089] [0.064]
lnMolLag -0.034*** -0.002 -0.023 0.002 -0.003 -0.006 -0.041* -0.015* -0.066** -0.053***
[0.010] [0.008] [0.021] [0.007] [0.010] [0.012] [0.022] [0.009] [0.028] [0.018]
Global avail. -0.002 0.017 -0.034 0.034 0.050 0.016 0.147*** -0.121*** 0.141*** 0.163***
[0.035] [0.029] [0.048] [0.028] [0.037] [0.037] [0.049] [0.035] [0.053] [0.036]
Years 2002-2005 0.114*** 0.059** -0.017 0.029 0.050** -0.056*** -0.062*** 0.014 0.045 -0.010
[0.031] [0.025] [0.028] [0.025] [0.022] [0.020] [0.023] [0.023] [0.033] [0.024]
Years 2006-2009 0.147*** 0.091*** -0.008 0.097*** 0.071** -0.046 -0.133*** 0.046 -0.043 -0.012
[0.038] [0.032] [0.040] [0.033] [0.030] [0.030] [0.034] [0.028] [0.047] [0.035]
N 24,572 19,554 15,713 13,296 24,390 19,881 19,481 24,690 15,804 16,437
Pseudo R2 0.28 0.38 0.22 0.30 0.28 0.11 0.17 0.25 0.15 0.18





Appendix Table 3: Regressions of No. of Generic Manufacturers on Market Size and Controls
U.S. U.K. Canada France Germany Italy Spain Japan Brazil Mexico
lnSales 0.715*** 0.340*** 0.566*** 1.588*** 2.581*** 0.663*** 0.981*** 1.825*** 1.115*** 0.421***
[0.086] [0.043] [0.100] [0.188] [0.263] [0.196] [0.189] [0.181] [0.156] [0.079]
Licensees 0.468 -0.192 -0.246 -0.600 0.059 0.267 1.321** -0.148 0.903* 0.217
[0.503] [0.135] [0.368] [0.503] [0.163] [0.487] [0.593] [0.403] [0.486] [0.287]
Orig. forms -0.548*** 0.148 -0.583*** 0.636 0.663 0.778 0.784 0.164 0.412 0.343*
[0.205] [0.115] [0.221] [0.414] [0.420] [0.495] [0.657] [0.359] [0.411] [0.196]
OTC share -0.013* -0.001 -0.025** 0.026*** -0.002 0.040*** 0.012 0.023 0.009
[0.008] [0.002] [0.010] [0.007] [0.013] [0.010] [0.022] [0.016] [0.012]
Hosp. share -0.016* -0.008** -0.045*** -0.054 -0.150*** -0.031 -0.027 -0.042**
[0.009] [0.004] [0.013] [0.036] [0.038] [0.020] [0.028] [0.017]
Ext. release -3.291*** -0.188 -1.761*** -0.704 -1.009 2.432** -2.710*** -0.640 -2.354*** -1.317***
[0.289] [0.365] [0.396] [1.329] [1.484] [1.142] [0.865] [2.306] [0.316] [0.185]
IV form -2.145*** -0.637** -0.123 -3.149* 1.365 2.586 -1.151 -0.540 1.076 0.015
[0.556] [0.248] [0.961] [1.623] [2.830] [1.729] [1.467] [1.539] [0.980] [0.522]
Topical form -2.269*** -0.559*** -1.606*** 1.647 -8.072*** -0.966** -2.417*** -1.964** -1.010 -1.360***
[0.655] [0.149] [0.293] [2.218] [0.481] [0.464] [0.900] [0.998] [1.086] [0.338]
Other form -1.420*** -0.324 -1.630*** -2.122** -5.745*** -0.723 -2.143** -1.530** -0.643 -1.264***
[0.474] [0.262] [0.418] [0.991] [0.702] [0.455] [0.967] [0.616] [0.691] [0.243]
lnGlobalAge 4.695*** 1.582** 3.218*** 5.587 11.097*** 4.587*** 7.204*** 2.382* 2.721*** 2.459***
[0.999] [0.615] [0.887] [3.711] [2.913] [1.395] [1.757] [1.395] [1.048] [0.822]
lnMolLag -0.327** 0.036 -0.759*** -0.359 -0.207 -0.357 -1.221* 0.031 -0.965*** -0.489***
[0.149] [0.058] [0.215] [0.222] [0.336] [0.273] [0.687] [0.226] [0.317] [0.159]
Global avail. 0.759 0.180 0.885** 0.903 2.594*** -0.427 2.177** 0.184 1.168*** 1.064***
[0.546] [0.270] [0.391] [0.801] [0.957] [0.716] [0.917] [0.769] [0.426] [0.319]
Years 2002-2005 -0.622 -0.175 0.493 1.138 0.825 -0.172 0.355 -1.082*** 1.332*** 0.375*
[0.524] [0.345] [0.371] [1.782] [0.977] [0.354] [0.542] [0.358] [0.313] [0.223]
Years 2006-2009 0.385 -0.199 0.497 3.803*** 2.612** 1.867** 1.739* -0.347 1.479*** 0.570*
[0.528] [0.389] [0.468] [1.295] [1.292] [0.826] [0.925] [0.528] [0.500] [0.318]
N 5,665 3,580 4,137 1,544 5,203 3,290 5,775 5,962 6,115 3,726
Marginal effects from Negative-Binomial regressions, clustered by molecule; robust standard errors in brackets, significant at ***p<0.01, 
**p<0.05, *p<0.10
Appendix Table 4: Regressions of Normalized Generic Prices on No. of Generic Manufacturers and Controls
U.S. U.K. Canada France Germany Italy Spain Japan Brazil Mexico
GenMfrBrand 0.029 -0.097*** -0.014** -0.014 -0.009** 0.002 -0.006 -0.010*** -0.006** 0.038*
[0.043] [0.033] [0.005] [0.009] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.002] [0.002] [0.020]
GenMfrUnbr. -0.043*** -0.076*** -0.011** -0.006 -0.015*** -0.043*** -0.013*** 0.001 -0.012** -0.080**
[0.005] [0.014] [0.005] [0.004] [0.003] [0.006] [0.002] [0.002] [0.005] [0.037]
Ext. release 0.084 0.224*** 0.074** -0.019 0.031 0.036 0.142*** -0.047 0.041 0.383***
[0.067] [0.074] [0.029] [0.020] [0.033] [0.043] [0.033] [0.034] [0.051] [0.087]
IV form -0.099 0.140*** 0.027 -0.138** 0.240*** -0.074 -0.028 0.126*** 0.052* -0.094*
[0.070] [0.048] [0.042] [0.057] [0.043] [0.073] [0.040] [0.033] [0.029] [0.055]
Topical form 0.200** 0.278*** 0.016 0.343*** 0.115** -0.069 0.069*** 0.112** 0.222** 0.061
[0.089] [0.040] [0.038] [0.039] [0.050] [0.051] [0.025] [0.049] [0.094] [0.086]
Other form 0.076 0.178** -0.060 -0.061** 0.198*** 0.063* 0.058 0.165*** 0.071** 0.070
[0.072] [0.068] [0.040] [0.027] [0.075] [0.034] [0.035] [0.034] [0.030] [0.079]
lnGlobalAge -0.156 -0.542*** 0.060 0.026 -0.385*** -0.003 -0.200*** -0.353*** -0.059 -0.215*
[0.109] [0.115] [0.057] [0.046] [0.066] [0.074] [0.052] [0.064] [0.050] [0.117]
lnMolLag 0.013 0.029* -0.013 -0.002 0.021 -0.014 0.016 0.001 0.016 -0.028
[0.015] [0.015] [0.011] [0.008] [0.013] [0.014] [0.012] [0.006] [0.014] [0.026]
Global avail. 0.015 -0.079 0.033 0.000 0.005 0.009 -0.056*** 0.068*** -0.084*** -0.016
[0.042] [0.048] [0.028] [0.033] [0.040] [0.044] [0.021] [0.024] [0.025] [0.055]
Years 2002-2005 0.011 -0.097*** -0.055** -0.040* -0.026 -0.126*** -0.114*** -0.049*** -0.246*** -0.058
[0.036] [0.031] [0.027] [0.023] [0.029] [0.023] [0.018] [0.017] [0.017] [0.041]
Years 2006-2009 0.011 -0.331*** -0.092*** -0.250*** -0.151*** -0.298*** -0.277*** -0.128*** -0.273*** -0.129**
[0.043] [0.045] [0.031] [0.034] [0.042] [0.032] [0.023] [0.023] [0.027] [0.056]
N 5,097 3,369 3,820 1,522 4,768 2,922 5,236 5,672 4,671 2,814
R-squared 0.32 0.44 0.10 0.55 0.54 0.62 0.67 0.35 0.54 0.15




U.S. U.K. Canada France Germany Italy Spain Japan Brazil Mexico
GenPrice -0.144*** -0.228*** -0.382*** -0.262* -0.202** 0.039 -0.068 0.050 -0.346*** 0.140**
[0.039] [0.053] [0.115] [0.135] [0.083] [0.165] [0.124] [0.093] [0.102] [0.068]
GenMfrBrand 0.022 0.063* 0.031*** 0.017 0.010* -0.004 0.030*** 0.005** 0.011*** 0.026***
[0.023] [0.033] [0.010] [0.016] [0.006] [0.009] [0.007] [0.002] [0.004] [0.009]
GenMfrUnbr. 0.009*** 0.095*** 0.036*** 0.035*** 0.019*** 0.021 0.007** 0.003* 0.023*** 0.008
[0.003] [0.020] [0.010] [0.007] [0.003] [0.014] [0.003] [0.002] [0.007] [0.020]
Ext. release -0.087* -0.070 0.109* 0.052 -0.043 0.183 -0.086 0.131 -0.093 -0.051
[0.044] [0.069] [0.061] [0.047] [0.092] [0.136] [0.115] [0.138] [0.099] [0.066]
IV form -0.174*** -0.279*** 0.040 -0.161 0.079 0.153 0.001 0.148*** -0.086 -0.048
[0.034] [0.105] [0.068] [0.169] [0.084] [0.100] [0.097] [0.040] [0.056] [0.078]
Topical form 0.017 -0.156*** 0.023 -0.151*** 0.091 -0.003 0.019 -0.211*** 0.068
[0.032] [0.041] [0.076] [0.046] [0.084] [0.218] [0.022] [0.057] [0.083]
Other form -0.046 -0.239*** 0.056 -0.187*** 0.075 0.088 0.001 0.131*** -0.048 -0.006
[0.037] [0.041] [0.055] [0.062] [0.057] [0.077] [0.060] [0.048] [0.063] [0.070]
lnGlobalAge 0.056 0.142 0.099 0.040 -0.076 0.137 -0.006 -0.149 -0.237** 0.116
[0.060] [0.114] [0.069] [0.102] [0.101] [0.152] [0.110] [0.104] [0.100] [0.110]
lnMolLag 0.012* -0.014 -0.024 -0.003 0.021* 0.012 -0.011 0.000 0.099** 0.010
[0.007] [0.015] [0.015] [0.018] [0.011] [0.023] [0.034] [0.005] [0.038] [0.026]
lnGenAge 0.091*** 0.092*** 0.077*** 0.102*** 0.115*** 0.041 0.099*** 0.042*** 0.140*** 0.090***
[0.011] [0.016] [0.020] [0.013] [0.015] [0.030] [0.016] [0.014] [0.021] [0.024]
Global avail. -0.037* 0.000 0.047 -0.039 0.018 -0.101 -0.040 0.038 0.015 -0.004
[0.021] [0.048] [0.044] [0.033] [0.032] [0.064] [0.048] [0.027] [0.049] [0.060]
Years 2002-2005 0.136*** 0.177*** 0.032 0.039 0.036 0.030 0.002 0.028* 0.065* 0.051
[0.027] [0.056] [0.031] [0.041] [0.033] [0.056] [0.035] [0.015] [0.036] [0.038]
Years 2006-2009 0.182*** 0.155*** 0.010 0.188*** 0.001 -0.046 -0.021 0.033* 0.181*** 0.070
[0.027] [0.059] [0.033] [0.044] [0.049] [0.078] [0.050] [0.019] [0.052] [0.050]
N 5,097 3,369 3,680 1,514 4,566 2,922 5,236 5,385 4,671 2,814
R-squared 0.47 0.57 0.35 0.68 0.52 0.15 0.31 0.13 0.45 0.25
Appendix Table 5: Regressions of Generic Share of Volume on Normalized Generic Price, No. of Generic Manufacturers 
and Controls
Marginal effects from OLS regressions, clustered by molecule; robust standard errors in brackets, significant at ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, 
*p<0.10